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Introduction
Organized crime is violent by definition (Geis 
1966). Criminal syndicates pursuing profit 
through illegal means often face threats from 
new competitors who look to rip away segments 
of their business and steal their profits. Intimidation and violence 
against rivals, coupled with a demand for unwavering loyalty from 
members of one’s own gang, are the typical responses of threatened 
organizations attempting to preserve the status quo and retain control 
over their illicit operations (Conklin 2007: 316). As with other types 
of crime, organized crime has a spatial component as well (Rossmo 
2000; Chainey and Ratcliffe 2005; Ridgeway and Tita 2007). It is 
committed in a certain area, and the offenders generally occupy a 
distinctive geographical zone (Herbert 1976) where they enforce 
rules that carry punishments if they are not followed. Mexican drug 
organizations certainly have been territorial since the beginnings 
of drug cultivation in Mexico almost a century ago. But violence 
generally remained clustered in certain areas where production and 
smuggling were most pervasive: specifically, the Pacific Coast along 
the Sierra Madre Mountains (Astorga 2005). 
It was when Mexico began 
to become the main drug sup-
plier for the United States 
that violence levels increased 
sharply. Also, the unprec-
edented wave of brutality 
began spiking in 2000 when 
opposition party President 
Vicente Fox took office, end-
ing 71 years of single party 
rule by the Institutional Revo-
lutionary Party (PRI). That 
prompted the emergence of 
new political powerbrokers 
and a series of fresh strate-
gies against drug producers 
and smugglers, many of 
whom had been openly pro-
tected by the old regime in 
exchange for bribes. Things 
have only gotten worse more 
recently. Drug violence has 
killed nearly 50,000 people 
in the last six years, and claimed 15,273 victims in 2010 alone, 
according to Mexican government figures. Killings not only skyrock-
eted, they also became more brutal, featuring beheadings, victims 
dumped in mass graves, and corpses hung from crowded highway 
overpasses or tossed into rush hour traffic. 
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The powerful illicit narcotics trade of today’s Mexico didn’t happen by 
accident. The country’s close proximity to the United States, the world’s 
economic powerhouse and also the largest global market for illegal 
drugs, pushed Mexican syndicates toward developing drug-trafficking 
prowess. But the shift in the country’s drug smuggling hierarchy after 
Fox took power was also heavily influenced by a larger, international 
reorganization of the illegal narcotics market — a reorganization 
that was decades in the making. Mexico had long produced drugs 
like marijuana and opium poppy, but its kingpins gained stature in 
the late 1980s and early 1990s when they began smuggling cocaine. 
Then, unexpected help came from Washington. A U.S.-led crackdown 
on Caribbean smuggling routes that had moved cocaine from the 
jungles of South America to Miami via tropical islands forced gangs 
to alter how they smuggled cocaine into the U.S., pushing the flow of 
illegal narcotics toward Central and 
South America. American authori-
ties also helped bring down the Cali 
and Medellín cartels in Colombia, 
leaving a power vacuum that Mex-
ican-based drug gangs had little 
trouble filling (Cook 2007: 1). 
By the early 2000s, cocaine was 
flowing north through Mexican 
territory as seamlessly as native 
drugs like heroin and opium poppy 
always had, and Mexican trafficking 
groups had supplanted all others 
around the hemisphere as the top 
source of illegal drugs reaching the 
United States (INCS 2008, 2009). 
It was then that violence reached 
unprecedented levels.
Hypothesis and Methodology
The central hypothesis of this 
study is that there is a relation-
ship between areas that are drug 
hubs (i.e., municipalities that pro-
duce and/or smuggle at least two 
types of drugs) and the number of 
killings taking place there. Killings 
spread out across the country as 
new municipalities become drug hubs over time. 
Determining Areas under Study
Tracking correlations between demographic data and the main 
drug-smuggling and production areas of Mexico can help us better 
understand the dynamics of drug-related violence over time. Due 
to the lack of demographic data disaggregated to the municipal 
level, population density and marginalization were selected as main 
descriptors. Marginalization is defined by Mexico’s Secretary of 
Social Development (SEDESOL) as an index that integrates poverty 
levels, access to education and health benefits, as well as the level of 
development of basic and productive infrastructure in the country’s 
different municipalities. Population data was obtained from Mexico’s 
Institute of Statistics and Geography (INEGI), while the data on drug-
related killings corresponds to the database released by the Office of 
Mexico’s Presidency in January 2011. This study included only the 
municipalities that had had at least one drug-related homicide every 
year (2007–2010), because the inclusion of municipalities with no 
crime could bias the results. The data on drug eradications (marijuana 
and opium poppies) and seizures (cocaine and methamphetamine 
labs) was obtained through a Freedom of Information Act Request 
(FOIA) by the author of this paper.
Times Series Analysis
Drug production areas are determined by certain physical charac-
teristics like soil type, altitude, and climate, and thus are not very 
likely to totally change locations from one year to another, but rather 
expand to new, better, and/or safer 
places. Taking this caveat into con-
sideration, the study determined the 
main producers for the total four-
year period by querying the data to 
select only the municipalities where 
drug eradications of marijuana and 
opium poppy of at least 10 hectares 
had occurred each year, between 
2007 and 2010. The process that 
was followed to establish the main 
cocaine smugglers was different. 
Considering that cocaine started 
being heavily smuggled through 
Mexico only in the late 1990s, and 
cocaine seizures greatly shift year 
after year, just those municipalities 
were selected where at least 10 kilo-
grams of cocaine were seized in at 
least one of the four years under 
study. For synthetic drug labs, 
which have been developed still 
more recently, the count followed 
municipalities where at least one lab 
was seized in one of the four years 
between 2007 and 2010. The areas 
of drug-related killings for each year 
of the period being studied were 
determined by establishing the homicide rate per 100,000 people. 
Drug Hubs and Killings Distribution
To determine the relationship between these two factors, data on 
drugs was queried to calculate the many possible combinations of 
two and three different drugs for production and/or smuggling. 
Using factorials, the combinations were determined as 6 for the 
former (4C2 = 6) and 4 for the latter (4C3= 4). After determining 
the combinations for every series, an algorithm was created using 
Boolean algebra to detect by iteration those municipalities that 
fulfilled the requirements for every combination. To complete the 
process, municipalities with more than 10 killings for each of the 
years under analysis were selected by querying the data. 
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Analysis
An overlay analysis showed a relationship between areas with high 
marginalization levels and generally low population density, and 
areas that are the main drug producers.
The main areas for marijuana, opium poppy, and synthetic drugs 
are located along the Sierra Madre Mountains, particularly on the 
Pacific Coast, while cocaine shipments have been detected on both 
the Caribbean and the Pacific Coasts, and even more often in areas 
bordering the United States and near major ports and highways.
A time series analysis showed a progression, both in killing rates 
and in their spread along the Pacific Coast and the border with the 
U.S. By 2007, the situation seemed more under control, with drug-
related killings limited to certain areas including the border cities of 
Tijuana and Juárez and the coastal region of Guerrero state and the 
areas surrounding Culiacán, the capital of Sinaloa state. Only a few 
municipalities had a drug-related homicide rate of more than 40.1 
per 100,000 people, which is fairly high in comparison to interna-
tional figures and the rate reported by Mexico to the United Nations 
Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), which for 2007 was 8.1 per 
100,000 for the whole country (UNODC 2011).
For 2010, killings were totally out of control, with most of the 
municipalities hardest hit recording homicide rates above 25.1 per 
100,000 people. That compares to 21.6 in Panama, 24.9 in the Domini-
can Republic, 11.3 in Costa Rica, 33.4 in Colombia, 4.6 in the U.S., 
1.2 in Ireland, and 0.8 in Germany for the same year (UNODC 2011). 
Mexico, meanwhile, officially reported a national homicide rate of 
12.7, 17.7, and 21.5 homicides per 100,000 people, respectively, for 
the years 2008, 2009, and 2010. 
Again, an overlay analysis showed a spatial relationship between 
the areas hardest hit by drug-related killings and municipalities that 
are drug hubs, defined as those areas that produce or smuggle two 
and three different drugs in the same year. The maps (see full-text 
online version) show that these areas are not necessarily the main 
producers. The series also shows a relationship between killings and 
the main highways (those that have at least four lanes). 
The series shows how the number of drug hubs across the country 
has been increasing since 2007, particularly in the areas near the cities 
of Acapulco, Morelia, and Chihuahua. From 254 municipalities that 
were two-drug hubs in 2007, the number jumped to 307 in 2010, 
while the three-drug hubs went from 20 to 87 in the same period.
These maps also show an increasing concentration of killings 
around Mexico City, especially in Morelos and Mexico states over 
time. Meanwhile, gruesome homicides started appearing along the 
Gulf Coast, a territory in dispute between the Zetas and the Gulf 
drug cartels, in an area where no drug hubs have yet been detected 
because of insufficient available data.
Conclusions and Policy Implications
It is easy to discern that not all the municipalities that are main 
producers of at least one drug are necessarily violent. Conversely, 
municipalities that bear the brunt of drug-related homicides tend to 
become drug hubs because they are well connected via infrastruc-
ture or close to main highways. But drug hubs are not necessarily 
in main production areas and vice versa. A good example of this is 
the state of Oaxaca, which has many municipalities that have been 
traditional producers of marijuana. There are almost no drug hubs 
there, however, and no related killings reported. 
One of the main conclusions of this study is that violence is not 
strictly tied to drug trafficking and production but also to margin-
alization. Municipalities that are drug hubs coincide with areas of 
great marginalization in Nayarit, Guerrero, and Michoacán states, 
as well as in the “Golden Triangle” of heightened narcotics production 
located in the conjunction of Durango, Chihuahua, and Sinaloa states. 
The fact that homicides in 2010 greatly increased along the Gulf 
Coast, particularly in Tamaulipas state—where the data collected does 
not allow us to determine whether drug hubs exist there—may indicate 
the changing business of the drug organizations. The Gulf Coast is an 
area in dispute between the fierce Zetas and Gulf cartels, and the Zetas 
have become known for kidnapping immigrants heading north in 
an attempt to sneak into the U.S. Zeta operatives then often kill the 
immigrants they kidnap. In this way, the growing drug-related violence 
in this area suggests that, in the ever-evolving environment in which 
drug organizations develop, trafficking is only one of the criminal activi-
ties in which cartels now engage. Therefore, their new crimes may very 
well cause much greater, and new forms of, violence in the near future.
This paper’s analysis indicates that any serious effort at reducing 
Mexico’s growing drug violence should start with further study of 
the country’s elaborate transportation networks for illegal drugs, as 
well as additional research to determine which kind of narcotic has 
more incidence in the killings. ✹
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